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The United States has become a sophisticated economy where its 
chief exports consist primarily of services and advanced technologies.  
The Industrial Revolution marked the significant turning point when 
the United States set aside the plow as an agrarian nation and became 
the industrious force it is today. That is not to say, however, that the 
plow has gone unused. As the country’s technologies and work force 
have evolved, so too have its farmers. In the state of Oregon, 15% of 
all economic activity relates to agriculture; the industry as a whole 
directly creates 260,000 jobs and adds $22 billion annually to 
Oregon’s net state product.1 A relatively new, but rapidly growing 
commodity in Oregon’s agricultural mix is the blueberry. Due to its 
purported health benefits, the blueberry has seen rocketing demand 
growth both domestically and internationally, and exports of 
blueberries out of the United States have grown by 44% over the last 
three years.2 Demand has seen particularly rapid growth on the Asian 
 
 J.D. 2014, University of Oregon School of Law. 
1 From Field to Fork, 1000 FRIENDS OF OR., http://friends.org/FieldtoFork (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2012). 
2 See U.S. Blueberry Industry, ECON. RESEARCH SERVICE U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
tbl.24, http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1 
765 (last updated June, 2013).  
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continent, and South Korea is posed to join in the fray as they recently 
enjoyed importing their first fresh blueberries ever in the summer of 
2012. 
South Korea looks to be a great opportunity for the continued 
growth of Oregon’s blueberry industry. Thanks to a recent “market-
access agreement” between the United States and Korea, the state of 
Oregon is participating in a two-year probationary period where they 
will be the only state allowed the first-time opportunity to export 
fresh blueberries into South Korea.3 South Korea has very little 
domestic agriculture—in fact it makes up only 3% of the nation’s 
GDP—and thus it depends on international trade and imports for 
many of its agricultural products.4 When added with the fact that the 
Korean consumer base has fully embraced blueberries health benefits, 
supply in the country is having a hard time keeping up with the 
demand.5 This has spurred Oregon blueberry producers into 
proceeding into the Korean market despite a large tariff of 40.5% on 
their product.6 This probationary period is being seen as an exclusive 
opportunity for Oregon companies to gain untapped market share in 
the Korean marketplace, and could prove to be a catalyst in the 
industry’s already rapid rise. 
Potential success aside, the large tariff on blueberries and other 
trade issues with South Korea create impediments to the industry’s 
growth. To better understand how Oregon blueberries arrived in this 
position, and in order to see what options are available to the industry, 
this Article discusses the growth of the Oregon blueberry industry, the 
recent international agreements affecting Oregon blueberries, and the 
legal framework that make up those agreements. Specifically, this 
discussion looks into both the market-access agreement between 
Oregon and South Korea and the U.S.-Korea Fair Trade Agreement, 
as well as how to negotiate within these agreements moving forward. 
 
3 A Green Light for Fresh Oregon Blueberries to South Korea, OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.oregon.gov/oda/pages/news/111005blueberries.aspx 
[hereinafter Green Light for Oregon]. 
4 See U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide and Selected 
Sectoral Effects, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N E-3 (Sept. 2007), www.usitc.gov 
/publications/332/pub3949.pdf. 
5 Green Light for Oregon, supra note 3. 
6 Mitch Lies, Blueberries Get Boost from S. Korea, CAPITAL PRESS (Sept. 13, 2012, 
12:00 PM), http://www.capitalpress.com/content/ml-korean-blueberries-090612. 
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I 
OREGON BLUEBERRY INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 
Oregon is the second largest blueberry producer in the United 
States.7 The industry has its roots in the northeastern part of the 
United States. It’s the native home of wild blueberries and the 
birthplace of the “cultivated” blueberry—the berries seen sold on 
shelves today.8 Soon after the wild blueberry was cultivated in the 
early 1900s, the nurseries propagating the plants sold them to farmers 
in Oregon, Washington, New Jersey, and North Carolina.9 The past 
decade has been particularly good for the Oregon blueberry industry. 
Since the late 1990s the industry has experienced over 100% 
growth,10 and from 2009 to 2010 Oregon producers saw an increase 
of revenues from $37,920,000 to $63,609,000.11 Oregon growers have 
recognized the growing demand for blueberries and have stepped up 
production to try and capture the unsatisfied consumer demand. 
Along with increasing the sheer number of producing acres of 
blueberry plants in the state, growers have made investments into 
research and development of the plant and have enjoyed success in 
increasing plants’ yield per acre.12 From 2000 to 2005, the acreage of 
producing blueberry plants in Oregon doubled; however, in that same 
time span the actual poundage of blueberries produced tripled.13 
The success of the blueberry has come mainly from scientific 
research linking the fruits’ antioxidant properties with amazing health 
benefits. Demand for the berry has grown so quickly that as it stands 
the current supply of blueberries is not meeting international 
demand.14 In the last two years alone, United States exports of 
blueberries have increased from 86.5 million pounds to 124.5 million 
 
7 OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2011 AGRIPEDIA at 11 (2012), available at http://www.oregon 
.gov/ODA/docs/pdf/pubs/agripedia_book.pdf. 
8 Cindy Rovins, A Legend from the New Jersey Pine Barrens This One is True and It’s 
Blue, RUTGERS, www.njfarmfresh.rutgers.edu/jersey-blues.asp (last visited Sept. 23, 
2013). 
9 History of the Cultivated Blueberry Industry, U.S. HIGHBUSH BLUEBERRY COUNCIL, 
http://foodservice.blueberrycouncil.org/about_history.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
10 Oregon Blueberry Industry, OR. AGRIC., http://oregonfresh.net/education /oregon      
-agriculture-production/oregon-blueberry-industry/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
11 OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 7 at 14. 
12 Amelie Talcott Brazelton, The Cultivate Blueberry Industry: Past Present and Future 
(unpublished Honors thesis, University of Oregon) (on file with Knight Library, 
University of Oregon). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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pounds.15 Blueberries have seen tremendous success in the Asian 
markets, particularly within Japan and Hong Kong.16 Frozen 
blueberries have also become a popular commodity in South Korea; 
and their recent success along with the recent access for fresh 
blueberries in Korea creates an appetizing opportunity for the Oregon 
blueberry industry.17 
II 
MARKET-ACCESS OVERVIEW 
Up until recently, the South Korean government had blueberries 
placed on a prohibited import list primarily due to health concerns 
associated with shipping fresh fruit into the country.18 As a member 
of the WTO, South Korea would typically be barred from creating 
such a sweeping restriction to trade as a flat out ban.19 However, 
Article XX(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 
(GATT) provides that no provision within the GATT shall be 
construed to prevent a country from implementing measures 
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”20 South 
Korea imposed the ban on fresh blueberries as a supposed necessity to 
protect its domestic plant health from various pests and plant maladies 
foreign to South Korea. 
Laws that regulate food and plant safety are categorized for 
purposes of international trade as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures. When SPS measures are used to restrict trade, Article 
XX(b) is supplemented by the World Trade Organization Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement).21 The SPS agreement requires, among other things, that 
a WTO member implementing domestic SPS measures base those 
measures on international standards unless the country has some sort 
 
15 U.S. Blueberry Industry, supra note 2. 
16 Id. 
17 See Steve Herman, Blueberries a Big Hit in South Korea, VOICE OF AMERICA, 
http://www.voanews.com/content/blueberries-a-big-hit-in-south-korea-100978094/1240 
77.html (last updated Aug. 17, 2010). 
18 Oregon Blueberries Enjoy Local and Worldwide Appeal, OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (July 
7, 2010), http://www.buylocalthinkglobal.com/Article.php?newsID=2890 [hereinafter 
Worldwide Appeal]. 
19 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI:1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT] (proscribing quantitative restrictions on trade). 
20 Id. art. XX(b). 
21 World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2.4, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement]. 
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of scientific justification for exceeding those standards.22 Rather than 
challenge Korea’s SPS measures as excessive, however, the United 
States sought more diplomatic resolutions to the ban on fresh 
blueberries. 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) worked closely with Korean 
officials for over ten years to alleviate South Korea’s phytosanitary 
concerns, and in 2011, they were finally successful in lowering 
sanctions on blueberries to allow fresh United States blueberries to be 
exported to Korea.23 The primary negotiating authority in the 
agreement with Korea was the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS).24 Typically, issues of opening up new 
markets for American commodities are reserved for the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), who specifically handles 
international commodity agreements and the expansion of market 
access for United States goods.25 When it comes to agriculture, 
however, there is the added SPS risk of transmitting disease or pests 
across borders. The Code of Federal Regulations allows APHIS to 
also negotiate for market access expansion in a more specialized 
context by granting it the direct authority and responsibility of 
“[d]eveloping and directing programs to enhance the trade in United 
States plants, animals, and their products in compliance with 
established international sanitary and phytosanitary standards.”26 
The SPS measures agreed to with Korea generally reflect those 
SPS standards established by the World Trade Organization.27 This 
has become standard practice among United States trade agreements; 
however, historically speaking, South Korea has used these technical 
barriers to trade as a means of protecting domestic producers from 
competition with imports.28 As SPS measures are nontariff barriers to 
 
22 Id. art. 3. 
23 See Worldwide Appeal, supra note 18. 
24 Press Release, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services, First Shipment of Fresh 
Blueberry Exports Arrive in S. Kor. (July 17, 2012), http://www.aphis.usda.gov 
/newsroom/2012/07/blueberries_sk.shtml [hereinafter APHIS Press Release]. 
25 Mission of the USTR, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/mission (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
26 7 C.F.R. § 371.8(b)(6)(2013). 
27 The United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, AGRIC. TECHNICAL ADVISORY 
COMM. ON TRADE IN FRUITS AND VEGETABLES 4 (Apr. 2007), http://www.ustr.gov 
/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Republic_of_Korea_FTA/Reports/asset_up 
load_file166_12777.pdf [hereinafter Technical Advisory Comm.]. 
28 Id. 
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trade, they are negotiated outside and supersede any preferential tariff 
treatment otherwise negotiated for. Thus, any action towards 
eliminating standing tariff trade barriers for blueberries with South 
Korea is of little value if the country unjustifiably erects SPS barriers 
at a later date.29 Fortunately, APHIS was successful in addressing SPS 
concerns with Korea, and on September 21, 2011, the Korean 
Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries announced an 
exemption for “Oregon fresh blueberries” from its prohibited imports 
list.30 
While the agreement satisfies the Korean government in terms of 
SPS concerns, it does so in the form of SPS measures that impose 
onerous growing and packaging regulations on Oregon producers. 
While all countries implement SPS measures for protection, most 
adhere to the SPS Agreement and conform to international standards 
and guidelines established primarily through custom and widespread 
use. In the blueberry industry, this typically entails state-certified 
inspection for defects on any shipment leaving the country, as well as 
a mix of annual and random chemical testing of the product to check 
for residual levels of pesticides and fungicides. South Korea’s SPS 
measures go above and beyond these international norms. For 
example, Oregon blueberry growers must select and register the 
specific fields from which they may export to Korea and subject those 
fields to regular inspection during growing periods by state officials.31 
Additionally, once harvested, fruit designated for Korea must be 
completely segregated from product harvested in non-registered 
fields.32 Thus, an Oregon blueberry packing house must have 
protocols in place that stop production in order to remove any non-
Korean blueberries in the production lines before being able to pack 
any berries in transit to Korea.33 
The agreement also imposes labeling in excess of those required by 
other importing countries. Packers are required to label each box of 
berries with identifying information regarding the packer and 
 
29 Id. 
30 U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERIVCE, KOREA IMPORT PROTOCOL FOR 
FRESH BLUEBERRY FROM OREGON (2011) (on file with author). 
31 Letter from Hyun-Kwan Shin, Dir. Of Export Mgmt. Div., Dep’t. of Plant 
Quarantine, to Murali Bandla, Director of Phytosanitary Issues Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t. of 
Agric. 3 (Sept. 22, 2011) (on file with author). 
32 Id. at 4. 
33 OR. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES: EXPORT OF FRESH BLUEBERRY 
FRUIT FROM OREGON TO KOREA 10, available at http://www.oregonblueberry.com 
/korea/korea_operational_guidelines(1).pdf (last visited on Nov. 30, 2012). 
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grower.34 While this may seem trivial, no other country imposes this 
requirement on the tens of thousands of cartons of blueberries 
produced daily in a single packinghouse. Oregon packers were caught 
unequipped the first year of access and many producers resorted to 
labeling boxes by hand. 
To top it off, pallets in shipments by air—in fact the only method 
of shipment utilized the during the first year of trade—are required to 
be individually wrapped and sealed in approved, insulated material as 
to prevent insects from contaminating the shipment.35 While 
preventing insect contamination is certainly a valid interest, the 
requirements for certified inspection before leaving the United States 
and when entering Korea provide that protection.36 The wrapping and 
sealing requirement, on the other hand, does more harm than good 
when it restricts, or cuts off entirely, air flow necessary to keep the 
berries at cold temperatures. Once harvested, blueberries are kept cold 
during storage and transportation to maintain quality by using cooler 
warehousing and refrigerated transportation that utilize air movement 
to keep the fruit cold. Preventing the air from getting to the berries 
has the potential to heat the product during shipment and impair 
quality below acceptable standards, subjecting the Oregon packers to 
liability for shipping nonconforming goods. 
Despite these frustrating compliance procedures, Oregon producers 
were generally enthusiastic about the opportunity to ship to Korea, as 
negotiations to get past the country’s SPS concerns had been in the 
works for nearly ten years.37 The coincidental ratification of the South 
Korea-United States Fair Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) in the 
same year as the market-access agreement bestows the added benefit 
of the creation of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Matters between the two countries.38 This committee is responsible 
for enhancing cooperation and consultation on SPS matters and 
facilitating trade between the parties.39 The committee does so by 
recognizing that scientific risk analysis will be used in establishing 
proper SPS procedures by working to increase the transparency of 
each country’s SPS measures and regulatory process and to make a 
 
34 Id. at 11. 
35 Id. at 12–13. 
36 Shin, supra note 31, at 4–5. 
37 See APHIS Press Release, supra note 24. 
38 United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Kor., Apr. 1, 2007, art. 8.3, 46 
I.L.M. 642 (2007) [hereinafter KORUS FTA]. 
39 Id. art. 8.3(2). 
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coordinated effort to address ongoing SPS concerns between the 
countries.40 However, ratification of the KORUS FTA comes with 
drawbacks as well for the Oregon blueberry industry. 
While the market-access agreement was going to proceed 
regardless of the free trade agreement’s (FTA)41 ratification, the 
implementation of the treaty has a significant effect on the blueberry 
trade with South Korea. The primary goal of the market-access 
agreement was to simply get blueberries off Korea’s prohibited 
imports list. Once that happened, and the FTA was ratified, 
blueberries became a subject of the FTA and fell under the general 
category of fruits in the genus Vaccinium—subject to a large tariff to 
be reduced gradually by 5% per year over 10 years. While the FTA 
grants immediate tariff elimination for nearly two-thirds of United 
States agricultural goods,42 blueberries were not fortunate enough to 
be included in that statistic, and Oregon’s first shipment of 
blueberries into Korea were subject to a 40.5% tariff.43 While the 
FTA superseded any tariff rates in effect prior to its ratification, it did 
not supersede any of the SPS measures imposed by the market-access 
agreement. Rather, the FTA provides that such measures will still be 
handled in the same manner as they were under the WTO, via 
domestic legislation—for example, the market-access agreement 
guided by the World Trade Organization Agreement on Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.44 
The tariff on American blueberries was imposed primarily for the 
benefit of local producers in Korea. Blueberries have only been 
grown in Korea for five years, and the typical Korean economical 
stance is to be very protective of its local infant industries and slowly 
introduce foreign competitors.45 In 2010 the country produced 1,500 
tons of blueberries locally.46 The local supply in Korea is far too small 
 
40 See id. art. 8.3(3)(a)–(g). 
41 In many international texts, the abbreviation “FTA” is used in place of “free trade 
area.” This discussion uses the alternate definition of an FTA, which is “free trade 
agreement.” 
42 WILLIAM H. COOPER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34330, THE U.S.-SOUTH 
KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (KORUS FTA): PROVISIONS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS 4 
(2013). 
43 Tom Burfield, First Oregon Blueberries Shipped to South Korea, THE PACKER (July 
20, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.thepacker.com/fruit-vegetable-news/shipping-profiles 
/First-Oregon-blueberries-shipped-to-South-Korea-163195886.html. 
44 KORUS FTA, supra note 38, art. 8.1. 
45 Technical Advisory Comm., supra note 27. 
46 Windsor Genova, Blueberry Demand in South Korea Rises as Healthy Fruit Become 
[sic] Sought-After, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Aug. 19, 2010, 12:21 AM),  
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to possibly fill the demand in the country;47 thus the actual effects 
seen from the tariff are the burdens placed on the consumer who must 
pay a premium for Oregon blueberries. And for how high the demand 
is, Oregon Blueberry Commission Chairmen Eric Pond thinks the 
Korean market is still “fairly untapped.”48 
It seems possible, then, that the two countries could serve one 
another’s purpose in reducing the tariff on United States blueberries. 
Not only would lowering the price of fruit in Korea help generate 
more demand via its affordability, but the increase in supply of 
blueberries in the country may also help increase consumer awareness 
of its availability and drive demand even further. Unfortunately for 
Oregon blueberries, the tariff’s location within the FTA with South 
Korea makes it practicably impossible to negotiate a tariff reduction 
for that single tariff line for the benefit of arguably only one of the 
country’s industries. 
III 
THE U.S.-KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
As a rule of thumb, a member of the WTO may not grant separate, 
preferential treatment to another country without granting that same 
treatment to every other member of the WTO.49 However, Article 
XXIV of the GATT allows members to create preferential trade 
arrangements amongst each other so long as other members of the 
WTO outside of the arrangement are accorded no less favorable 
treatment than they were prior to the any preferential agreement 
taking place.50 This allows WTO members to circumvent many 
provisions of the GATT and grant exclusive preferential treatment to 
another member beyond what the WTO would otherwise allow. The 
most commonly used form of applying preferential treatment has 
been the creation of free trade areas, which is formed by two or more 
member countries signing a free trade agreement to eliminate trade 
barriers amongst themselves. 
Generally speaking, elimination of tariffs under FTA’s occur at the 
ratification of the treaty itself—that is, after all, the purpose of fair 
 
www.ibtimes.com/blueberry-demand-south-korea-rises-healthy-fruit-become-sought-after 
-193351. 
47 Id. 
48 Green Light for Oregon, supra note 3. 
49 GATT, supra note 19, art. I:1. 
50 Id. art. XXIV:5. 
162 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 16, 153 
trade agreements. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Article 
XXIV:8(b) defines FTA’s as comprising of “a group of two or more 
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated on substantially all trade 
between the constituent territories in products originating in such 
territories.”51 However, the GATT provides no explanation on what is 
meant by “substantially all trade.” With no clear measure of what is 
necessary to satisfy the GATT requirement, the resulting FTA’s have 
ranged from the New Zealand-Singapore FTA, which eliminates all 
tariffs on goods originating in the parties upon entry into force into 
the agreement, to the Korean-U.S. FTA, which immediately 
eliminates tariffs on some products, eliminates tariffs on others over a 
number of years, and even excludes some products from tariff 
elimination altogether.52 
When choosing which tariffs to eliminate to fulfill the 
“substantially all trade” requirement, countries are guided by an 
implicit principle of reciprocity.53 When read with Article XXIV, 
Article I of the GATT, which prohibits unilateral tariff concession to 
a preferred trading partner, creates a principal of reciprocity between 
the negotiating countries by requiring all trade barriers to be 
eliminated while simultaneously forbidding one country from making 
any unilateral concession to the other.54 Some countries structure their 
FTA’s on a “product-by-product” basis that essentially create a 
product-for-product elimination of trade barriers between countries.55 
For example, if Country A wishes to benefit from duty-free exports of 
blueberries to Country B, Country A would need to eliminate its tariff 
on imports of blueberries originating in Country B. This form of 
reciprocity is only effective, however, when both countries both have 
import and export sensitivities for the same product. Typically, as is 
the case with the Korean-U.S. FTA, concessions are made by both 
countries across different sectors until the percentage of tariff lines 
 
51 Id. art. XXIV:8(b). 
52 Compare KORUS supra note 39, at Annex 2-B, with Agreement Between New 
Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership, January 1, 2001, available at 
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/s-cep-3.pdf. 
53 Jong Bum Kim, Legal Review of FTA Tariff Negotiations, RIETI 10, 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/07080601/pdf/3-1_E_Kim_Paper_o.pdf (last visited Sept. 
23, 2013). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 11. 
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given market access over total tariff lines are equal in both 
countries.56 
Since negotiating countries measure benefits from free trade in 
terms of net increased market access, little thought is given to 
consumers’ economic welfare during negotiations.57 Despite the fact 
that consumer welfare is often the rationale for entering into FTA’s, 
countries tend to negotiate from postures that reflect the narrow 
interests of weak or sensitive domestic sectors rather than the 
domestic economy as a whole.58 These narrow interests can be 
thought of as “political costs,” and although two countries may be 
able to strike a balance in terms of economic benefits, the deal may 
still fall through if the political costs are seen as being out of 
equilibrium.59 These political costs can range from domestic 
producers protesting the introduction of foreign competition to 
domestic laws mandating the achievement of principle negotiating 
objectives in trade agreements.60 News of United States blueberries 
entering the South Korean market was met by resistance among 
domestic producers. The South Korean blueberry industry has 
enjoyed rapid growth since the early 2000s, and it may be that the 
large tariff on United States blueberries was the result of political 
pressures to protect the budding domestic producers in South Korea.61 
IV 
MOVING FORWARD 
The issues impeding Oregon blueberry producers’ access to the 
South Korean market can be thought of as two separate battlefronts—
the tariff on blueberries and the SPS measures imposed on blueberry 
exporters. Various tools and resources are located within the 
battlefields of tariff policies and SPS regulations, and this portion of 
the discussion addresses each of these fronts in turn. 
 
56 See id. at 7, 11. 
57 Id. at 6. 
58 Id. at 6–7. 
59 Id. at 7. 
60 See id. 
61 Organic Morning Farm Blueberry Lands in Japan, AGRAFOOD (July 2011), 
http://www.agrafood.co.kr/news/news_view.asp?seq=2043&category=3010. 
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A. The Korean Tariff on Fresh Blueberries 
Regardless of what motivated the tariff currently imposed on 
United States blueberries, the fact remains that the tariff, as it stands, 
will continue to hamper Oregon (and eventually United States) 
exports of blueberries into South Korea for the next ten years. What 
remedies, then, can Oregon producers seek with such a potentially 
vast market for their fruit just beyond their reach? The answer may be 
within the text of the FTA itself. The FTA provides that “[o]n the 
request of either Party, the Parties shall consult to consider 
accelerating the elimination of customs duties set out in [the FTA]. 
An agreement by the Parties to accelerate the elimination of a 
customs duty on a good shall supersede any duty rate . . . for that 
good when approved by each Party in accordance with its applicable 
legal procedures.”62 This clause creates what seems to be a standing 
opportunity to renegotiate tariff elimination rates at the request of 
either nation. However, there is a question as to what the “applicable 
legal procedures” are in order to take advantage of this clause. 
The United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act allows the President to proclaim, subject to certain consultation 
and layover provisions, “such modifications as the United States may 
agree to with Korea regarding the staging of any duty treatment set 
forth in . . . the Agreement.”63 The consultation and layover 
provisions require the President to obtain advice regarding the 
proposed action from private sector actors as well as the United States 
International Trade Commission.64 Additionally, the President is 
required to submit a report to the Committee on Finance of the Senate 
and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives that details the action being proposed as well as the 
reasons for the action, and the advice obtained from the 
aforementioned groups.65 The President subsequently delegates the 
responsibilities under the consultation and layover provisions to the 
USTR.66 This information alone does not create a very distinct picture 
of how exactly one initiates or facilitates the initiation of accelerated 
 
62 KORUS supra note 38, art. 2.3. 
63 To Implement the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,265 
(Mar. 6, 2012), reprinted as amended in 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (2011) [hereinafter KORUS 
Implementation Act]. 
64 United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41, 
§ 104(1), 125 Stat. 428, 431 (2011); 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (2011). 
65 United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 104(2). 
66 KORUS Implementation Act, supra note 63. 
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tariff elimination. Luckily, this is not the first time the United States 
has negotiated accelerated tariff elimination under FTAs. 
There are multiple FTAs in which the United States has 
renegotiated for more rapid elimination of duties, including two 
treaties currently in force. In 1997, three years after its ratification, the 
North America Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) tariff elimination 
schedule was successfully renegotiated, with further rounds of 
accelerated tariff elimination negotiations occurring in 1998, 2000, 
and 2001.67 Additionally, the United States-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement (USC FTA) received accelerated rates of tariff elimination 
a little over four years after its ratification.68 Both these and prior 
FTAs contain clauses nearly identical to the accelerated tariff 
elimination clause and consultation and layover provisions located in 
the KORUS FTA.69 
The manner in which these clauses were implemented was also 
very similar. In the most recent cases the USTR posted notices in the 
Federal Register requesting the submission of petitions for certain 
products to receive accelerated tariff elimination treatment.70 The 
NAFTA request for petition submissions included detailed 
descriptions of what articles could be petitioned for, the timetable for 
processing the petitions, general instructions, as well as a model 
format that could be used by petitioners originally developed for the 
Canada-U.S. Fair Trade Agreement’s (CUS FTA) renegotiations.71 
Petitions under the NAFTA renegotiations could only cover a single 
product and were required to include a detailed description of the 
good in question, a statement of why the petitioner believes the 
product was classified in the tariff category in which it was initially 
placed, and copies of any relevant rulings in any NAFTA territories 
 
67 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., ANNUAL REPORT 2012 ANNEX III (2012), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Annex%20III.pdf. 
68 Id. 
69 Compare supra note 54, with North America Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act Sec. 201(b), 19 U.S.C. § 3301 (1993), and United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act § 201(b), Pub. L. No. 108-77 (2003). 
70 Compare Request for Petitions To Accelerate Tariff Elimination and Modify the 
Rules of Origin Under the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,355 (May 
25, 1997), with Implementation of the First Round of Accelerated Tariff Eliminations 
Under Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,989 
(May 25, 2007). 
71 See Implementation of the Accelerated Tariff Elimination Provision in the United 
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 55 Fed. Reg. 4501 (Feb. 8, 1990), and 
Implementation of the Accelerated Tariff Elimination Provision of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,186 (Dec. 23, 1993). 
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specifying the classification of the petitioned product.72 Following 
procedure adhered to under the CUS FTA, all countries reserved the 
right during negotiations to refuse to provide accelerated tariff 
elimination for those products protested by their domestic interested 
parties.73 The request for petitions under the USC FTA renegotiations 
contained the added element that interested parties in the United 
States should include whether they have discussed their proposals 
with their industrial counterparts in Chile and, if so, include what the 
results of those discussions were.74 Additionally, the USTR 
broadened the scope of petitions much further than NAFTA’s one 
item per petition limit to cover “the broadest appropriate range of 
items,” so that multiple tariff lines could be covered under a single 
petition.75 
One might reasonably expect that these procedures will be similar 
when the USTR decides to implement the KORUS FTA accelerated 
tariff elimination clause. However, the timing of when the USTR may 
release a request for petitions is still unclear. Under the NAFTA, the 
request came before the NAFTA itself was even ratified.76 
Conversely, under the USC FTA the request did not come until three 
years after its ratification.77 Regardless, Oregon producers may 
benefit from taking early steps towards petitioning the USTR. During 
this interim period, producers could begin coordinating with 
producers of similar products so that their petitions cover the 
“broadest appropriate range of items.” For example, under the Korean 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule, blueberries fall under the same tariff 
line as cranberries, bilberries, and other fruits of the same genus. 
Further still, products such as gooseberries and currants fall under a 
different tariff line but are still in the same “staging category,” that is, 
they are subject to the same tariff phase-out treatment. Additionally, 
Oregon producers could make headway in alleviating Korean 
producers’ concerns of foreign competition by reaching out and 
 
72 Implementation of the Accelerated Tariff Elimination Provision of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,186, 68,187 (Dec. 23, 1993). 
73 62 Fed. Reg. 25,989, 25,990 (May 12, 1997). 
74 Request for Petitions to Accelerate Tariff Elimination and Modify the Rules of 
Origin Under the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,355 (May 
25, 2007). 
75 Id. 
76 Implementation of the Accelerated Tariff Elimination Provision of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,186, 68,187 (Dec. 23, 1993). 
77 Request for Petitions To Accelerate Tariff Elimination and Modify the Rules of 
Origin Under the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,355 (May 25, 2007). 
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discussing with them the benefits of cooperation in opening up a new 
market. If successful, reports of these discussions could then be used 
to petition for the accelerated tariff elimination with the USTR. 
As an alternative to lowering the rate on the blueberry tariff line, 
Oregon producers may want to consider petitioning government 
officials to push for a reclassification of blueberries into a different or 
new tariff line altogether. While each country is generally free to 
classify products in its tariff schedule as it sees fit, the United States 
may be able to petition the Joint Committee, established by Article 
22.2 of the KORUS FTA, for a reclassification of blueberries. The 
Joint Committee is cochaired by the USTR and the Minister for Trade 
of Korea, and its purpose is to oversee the implementation and 
application of the provisions and commitments of the FTA—meeting 
on an annual basis or within thirty days by request of a party to 
address any issues arising under the FTA.78 Among its powers, the 
Joint Committee may “consider amendments to [the FTA] or make 
modifications to the commitments therein,” as well as “take such 
other action in the exercise of its function as the Parties may agree.”79 
This seems to put tariff classification well within the purview of the 
Joint Committee, and may be an effective forum for addressing this 
issue. 
Blueberries are currently included in the broad tariff line covering 
all berries of the genus Vaccinium. Among the more common berries 
of that genus are cranberries, bilberries, and, of course, blueberries. 
While all of these have many characteristics that make them alike, 
there are strong arguments for why these berries should be treated 
differently for trade purposes. The most glaring difference is the fact 
that these berries are not substitutes for one another. Each has a 
unique flavor and texture, and each have very different markets in 
which they are sold. Cranberries are generally considered too bitter to 
eat raw, and the vast majority of cranberries are processed into other 
products such as juices and sauces. Bilberries are soft and juicy, and 
their fragility makes transporting them difficult; consequently 
bilberries are typically sold frozen. Both cranberries and bilberries 
also ripen later in the year than blueberries. Given these differences, 
the United States should have a case as to why fresh blueberries 
should be afforded their own tariff line under the FTA. 
 
78 KORUS FTA, supra note 38, art. 22.4. 
79 Id. art. 22.3(c), (f). 
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Even if South Korea intentionally imposed the high tariff as a form 
of protectionism, both countries may find room for compromise in the 
reclassification approach. There are several, more preferable 
alternatives to a flat tariff that do not provide the apparent threat of 
foreign competition while still benefiting blueberry exporters. For 
example, a tariff-rate quote that allows the United States to export a 
certain, nonthreatening amount of blueberries to South Korea duty 
free before imposing higher rates would certainly be an improvement. 
Alternatively, a tariff that has higher rates for the short amount of 
time both countries’ industries are in competition and duty free 
treatment for the parts of the year when the two are not in conflict 
may also be a desirable solution. Due to slight climate differences, 
Korea’s blueberry season starts and ends slightly earlier than 
Oregon’s blueberry season, and such a tariff would grant Korean 
producers the protection they desire while still granting duty free 
treatment to Oregon producers later in the year. 
B. South Korea’s SPS Measures Affecting Exported Blueberries 
Oregon blueberry producers could also petition the government to 
challenge the onerous compliance measures imposed by South Korea 
under Article XXIII of the GATT. Although diplomatic resolution to 
these issues would be preferable and actually required to be sought by 
Article 22.3 of the KORUS FTA, the United States could still resort 
to using the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) within the WTO to 
challenge Korea’s SPS measures. Article XXIII provides a 
mechanism through which a WTO member may challenge another 
member’s measures or regulations as impairing or nullifying any 
benefit accruing under the GATT.80 While the United States and 
South Korea’s status as free trade areas exempts them from many 
provisions of the GATT, Article XXIV:12 requires that members take 
reasonable measures to ensure observance of other measures of the 
GATT to the greatest extent possible.81 Furthermore, the WTO 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV specifically 
states that Article XXIV:12 allows a country to challenge another’s 
domestic measures or regulations under Article XXIII,82 and the 
KORUS FTA contains language that allows for disputes arising under 
 
80 GATT, supra note 19, art. XXIII:1. 
81 Id. art. XXIV:12. 
82 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, ¶¶ 13–14, 33 I.L.M. 1153, 1163. 
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the FTA to be brought before the DSB if the dispute also arises under 
a WTO agreement.83 
Although South Korea may argue that its onerous compliance 
measures for shipping blueberries are necessary under Article XX(b) 
of the GATT and allowed by Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, the 
United States may still have a case that those measures are impairing 
its ability to export blueberries to South Korea.84 A member may only 
impose GATT noncompliant SPS measures only so long as those 
measures are not “a disguised restriction on international trade.”85 
Furthermore, Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement requires members to 
ensure that SPS measures implemented are not more trade-restrictive 
than required to achieve the desired level of protection.86 The SPS 
Agreement also states that a measure is not more trade-restrictive than 
necessary only if there is no other reasonable, less restrictive 
alternative that achieves the same level of protection.87 
The United States may be able to argue that South Korea’s 
measures are not necessary because there are reasonable, less 
restrictive means of addressing Korea’s phytosanitary concerns. 
Oregon exports blueberries to many of South Korea’s neighbors, 
including Japan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong, yet none of these 
countries impose additional intensive monitoring and shipping 
measures like those required by South Korea; rather they adhere to 
standard practices used in the international blueberry trade. To 
succeed in such an argument, the United States would need to prove 
either that current international standards for SPS measures affecting 
the trade of blueberries are a reasonable, less restrictive alternative to 
South Korea’s measures and achieves the same level of protection, or, 
alternatively, it would need to prove that the current level of 
protection South Korea’s SPS measures are designed to achieve is not 
justified by any sort of scientific explanation, but rather is a disguised 
restriction on international trade. The United States may have a strong 
case for such an argument, especially considering that Korea’s 
neighbors have nowhere near the heighted SPS concerns that the 
 
83 KORUS FTA, supra note 38, art. 22.6. 
84 See GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(b), and SPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 3.3 
(when read together, these provisions allow WTO members to implement non-GATT-
compliant SPS measures to protect human, animal, and plant life or health above and 
beyond international standards only if accompanied by a scientific justification). 
85 SPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 2.3. 
86 Id. art. 5.6. 
87 SPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 5 n.3. 
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country purports to have; however, further inquiry would need to be 
made into the exact scientific justifications South Korea is using to 
support its current SPS regime. 
It bears repeating that although the United States may have a strong 
case against South Korea through invocation of Article XXIII of the 
GATT, turning to the DSB to resolve these issues should be a last 
resort. The KORUS FTA was a great boon to the political relationship 
between the United States and South Korea, and bringing a claim 
against Korea in front of the WTO would certainly be a step 
backwards in that regard. The establishment of the Joint Committee 
and the SPS Committee, as well as the requirement that each country 
seek diplomatic resolutions for issues arising under the FTA, could 
very well open the legal avenues needed to increase blueberries’ 
market access in South Korea. 
Regardless of any hypothetical success in resolving the SPS 
measures implemented by South Korea in the market-access 
agreement, the tariff on blueberries remains the largest obstacle 
impeding the Oregon blueberry from thriving in Korea. With the 
rapid pace at which business is conducted in the modern age, these 
instruments and procedures set in place to obtain greater market 
access can seem sluggish and onerous. While Oregon blueberries may 
still explore other avenues of market penetration within South Korea, 
such as joint ventures with Korean importers to try and lower costs, it 
seems that if growers want to see trade barriers eliminated for their 
product their best option at this point is to prepare and be patient. If 
South Korea is as vast a market as producers believe it to be, it will be 
well worth the wait. 
CONCLUSION 
South Korea is still a promising market, despite the current tariff 
and SPS measures weighing Oregon producers down. I recently had 
the opportunity and privilege of accompanying Oregon Department of 
Agriculture delegates and industry members representing the Oregon 
blueberry private sector on a trip to Seoul to discuss the impact of the 
first year of importing fresh blueberries with South Korean importers 
and distributors. While all agreed the tariff on blueberries is a 
significant hurtle to increasing demand, most companies were eager 
to discuss alternative ventures such as joint promotional activities to 
at least help increase consumer awareness. 
If members of the Oregon blueberry industry reach out to these 
South Korean companies and form cooperative efforts towards market 
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penetration, the high demand for the product may be enough to 
increase blueberry exports despite the tariff. At the same time, the 
USTR is working towards accelerating tariff elimination and the 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Matters continues to 
resolve SPS issues. Successful efforts in all these endeavors would be 
monumental for Oregon blueberries, but even still, after taking ten 
years of negotiations just to be able to enter the market, any success in 
increasing market-access into Korea will be great progress. 
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